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This book is essentially the first monograph on the crusades proclaimed and at 
times sent to Frankish Greece during the thirteenth century. It begins with the Fourth 
Crusade of 1204 against Byzantium which resulted in the conquest and partition of 
most of continental and insular Greece among the participants of this crusade and ends 
with the failed plans of Charles of Anjou to head a crusade against Byzantium, which 
had re-captured Constantinople from the Latins in 1261. As the author explains in the 
introduction, hitherto this subject has been overshadowed by the themes of Church 
Union between the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox and the establishment of 
Latin states in the Greek mainland and islands. After reviewing the existing secondary 
literature and explaining the reasons why this subject is either overlooked or treated 
scantly in the studies published so far, he gives some background information on 
aggression against Byzantium in the crusades taking place prior to 1204 followed 
by a description of the political fragmentation characterizing Latin Greece. He also 
states, significantly, that ‘the main focus of the book …will be on the development 
of papal policy towards crusading in Romania (i.e. Latin Greece)’. This decision, 
which he justifies by observing the centrality of the papacy in initiating, authorizing, 
organizing and sometimes even conducting the crusades, inevitably determines his 
choice regarding the main source material of this monograph. As he points out: ‘the 
papal registers provide the core of evidence through which the crusades in Frankish 
Greece can be reconstructed’. Aware of the limitations and pitfalls involved in using the 
registers, the author supplements them with other literary and documentary sources 
such as the Latin chroniclers of the Fourth Crusade, the contemporary Byzantine 
historical accounts, the Chronicle of the Morea and Sanudo’s Istoria di Romania, 
documents on the negotiations for Church Union and other miscellanea. 
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Throughout this study the author makes it clear that papal policy towards 
crusading in Greece was evolutionary and that Latin Greece had to compete, more 
often than not unsuccessfully, with other areas of crusading and especially the Holy 
Land. One paradox was that the Fourth Crusade itself had never been proclaimed 
against the Greeks but against the Muslims of Egypt and Syria. Only after its 
diversion to Greece and the capture of Constantinople itself did Pope Innocent 
III legitimize the crusader conquests, indeed he did so at the behest of the Latin 
emperor Baldwin I, whose letters to the pope evoked the prospect of bringing the 
Greek Church under Roman obedience, asked his assistance in encouraging Latins 
to settle in the conquered Byzantine lands for temporal and spiritual rewards and 
promised that the crusaders would continue on to the Holy Land. These three 
arguments Baldwin raised were to form important considerations for the papacy 
when sanctioning crusades to Greece throughout the thirteenth century. When 
in May 1205 Pope Innocent III granted those who would help Emperor Baldwin 
consolidate the empire and church in Constantinople so that he could eventually go 
to the Holy Land ‘the same crusader indulgence that the Apostolic See has granted 
to other crusaders’, the former Byzantine Empire became an officially sanctioned 
crusade destination for the first time, even if it was still seen as a means to the end 
of recovering the Holy Land, not a crusader end in itself.
Indeed, reverses in both the Holy Land and the new Latin Empire of 
Constantinople undermined the papal legitimization of former Byzantine lands as a 
crusader destination. Following the annihilation of the Latin army by the Bulgarian 
King Kalojan outside Adrianople and the deaths of King Aimery of Jerusalem and 
his wife Isabella, Pope Innocent III in July 1205 angrily reminded his papal legates 
in the East that their mission was ‘not to capture Constantinople but for the defence 
of the remnants of the Holy Land’, although by the end of 1205 he was calling those 
who desired to assist the Holy Land to serve the Latin Empire, granting them a 
full crusading indulgence. In April 1206 the pope granted those crusaders about 
to set out to help the Latin Empire both remission of sins and absolution from all 
pilgrimage vows except those for the Holy Land, the first recorded instance of vow 
commutation for the Latin Empire, although those taking part seem to have suffered 
defeat in late 1207 after landing at Dyrrachium at the hands of Michael Doukas, the 
Greek ruler of Epirus. The failure, however, of the crusaders in Romania to proceed 
on to the Holy Land made them a target for criticism, as the pope knew well, not 
only among Latin Christians but also among the Byzantines and Bulgarians, who 
accused them of being false crusaders. The author describes how in response to 
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these charges Baldwin’s successor, the Latin emperor Henry, presented the Latins 
of Romania as crusaders in written appeals to the pope for more men and in the 
dispatch of sacred relics from Constantinople to the West. By 1212 this presentation 
was experiencing success, for Arnaud Amaury, the archbishop of Citeaux, spoke of a 
three-part crusade against ‘schismatics of the east, heretics of the west and Saracens 
of the south’, while Alberic of Trois-Fontaines included Greece among the crusading 
fronts in which reverses had occurred. While the establishment of the Latin Empire 
did little to promote Church Union, the fact that the Orthodox patriarch Michael 
Autoreianos around 1208-1210 offered indulgences to those willing to fight the 
Latins vividly illustrates how crusading incentives were understood and utilised by 
the papacy’s opponents in Greece and the Aegean area. By 1214, however, in the 
wake of the generally disappointing response to appeals in the West for assistance to 
the Latin Empire and the danger of such appeals detracting from help for the Holy 
Land, the pope sent his bull Quia major for the organization of a crusade to the 
Holy Land to all parts of Europe except Spain and Greece, an implicit admission 
that crusaders in Latin Greece were now expected to defend their conquests on the 
spot, not proceed to the Holy Land.
Under Pope Honorius (1216-1227) Latin Greece was further dissociated from 
the Holy Land in crusading appeals. He proclaimed two crusades preached mainly 
in France, Venice and Hungary, one in November 1217 for the liberation of the Latin 
emperor Peter of Courtenay and his legate Cardinal John Colonna, both captured by 
the ruler of Epiros Theodore Doukas, and the second in May 1223 for the relief of 
the embattled Latin kingdom of Salonica. Both were failures. The first was employed 
more as a threat to secure the liberation of the papal legate, for the pope could ill 
afford a crusade venture in Greece at a time when the army he had prepared for the 
Fifth Crusade was poised to strike at Egypt, and became a dead letter on the legate’s 
release. The second crusade expedition led by William the marquis of Montferrat, 
despite taking place after the conclusion of the Fifth Crusade, likewise failed, but 
presents interest on account of the broadening in the use of crusading mechanisms 
in a Greek context. For the first time plenary indulgences were granted to persons 
taking part in the expedition without an obligation to go on to the Holy Land and 
vows regarding the Holy Land were commuted for those taking part in the crusade 
in Romania. Another new development was the partial financing of the crusade 
through papal taxation. Also for the first time, Greeks were explicitly identified as 
enemies of the Roman Catholic faith, something satirized by crusade critics in the 
West, such as the troubadour Guilhem Figueira who satirized the papacy as being 
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ineffectual against the Muslims but eager to massacre Greeks and Albigensian 
Latins.
The author stresses how under Pope Gregory IX (1227-1241) crusading in 
Latin Greece reached the apogee of its development. This pope had assisted in the 
organization of the Fifth Crusade and during his pontificate crusading embraced 
various fronts, the Holy Land, the Baltic and Latin Greece. Innovations he introduced 
to crusading included the employment of mendicant friars in preaching, fundraising 
and combating heresy and schism. Initial calls to the Hungarians in 1232 to go on 
crusade against the Byzantine Greeks, with a commutation of the vows they had 
taken to help the Holy Land, failed to generate enthusiasm.  The pope now deferred 
the use of the crusade while negotiations for Church Union were in progress with 
the Byzantines, and for the first time Church Union was envisaged as an alternative 
to sustaining the Latin Empire. On their collapse in 1234, however, the pope 
deployed the crusade against the Byzantine Greeks to assist the beleaguered Latin 
Empire. A crusade summons in December 1235 was directed mainly to France 
and Hungary. It included requests to some nobles to commute their crusade vows 
from the Holy Land to the Latin Empire, and even the justification that a Greek 
re-capture of Constantinople would lead to the fall of the Holy Land on account of 
Greek collaboration with the infidels. 
Later summonses in January and December 1236, offering the same indulgences 
as for the Holy Land and extending the area of crusade preaching to England, 
introduced the novel argument of heresy as a reason for prosecuting the crusade in 
Latin Greece and the use of mendicant friars, especially Dominicans, in promoting 
it. The possessions of those participating would, moreover, be placed under papal 
protection. To fund the expedition the pope resorted to highly unpopular measures 
such as clerical taxation, including the Latin clergy in Greece, the use of legacies 
and donations meant for the Holy Land for Latin Greece instead and an organised 
system for the redemption of crusading vows on a grand scale. The fact that this 
crusade was being organized in parallel with one to the Holy Land only harmed it. 
An attempt to enlist the support of John Asen the king of Bulgaria ultimately failed, 
and attempts to recruit the Hungarian King Bela IV and the Holy Roman Emperor 
Frederick IV, previously under a sentence of excommunication, likewise failed, 
with crusades against Asen and Frederick being proclaimed in 1238 and 1239. The 
crusade, headed by the new Latin emperor Baldwin II following the withdrawal 
of Peter of Dreux the count of Britanny who had decided to go on the Holy Land 
Crusade instead, went forth in the summer of 1239 but with very limited success. 
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By November 1239 the English recruits under Richard of Cornwall solemnly swore 
to proceed exclusively to the Holy Land, rejecting the idea of crusading in Greece, 
and all that Baldwin could do was to besiege and storm the city of Tzurulum 
in Eastern Thrace. By 1240 it was clear that assisting the Latin Empire was an 
unpopular crusading objective in the West, and the only ones going there were the 
southern French heretics obliged to do so as a penance.
Following the pope’s death in 1241, and under his successors Innocent IV 
(1243-1254) and Alexander IV (1254-1261), crusading to Latin Greece was 
downscaled and finally abandoned. The author argues clearly that the conflict with 
the emperor Frederick II in Italy resulted in assistance to Latin Greece taking the 
form of fundraising, especially after the first Council of Lyon in 1245, and assigning 
its defence to Prince Geoffrey II of Achaia and local Latin prelates. The Mongol 
invasion of Hungary prevented any aid to Latin Greece arriving from that quarter 
and King Bela’s letter to the pope in around 1247 forcefully criticised the pope for 
diverting crusading resources urgently needed to defend Hungary from the Mongols 
to the Latin Empire and the Holy Land. Frederick II, in alliance with the Byzantine 
emperor John Vatazes at the time promised help in 1245 for the Latin Empire, the 
Holy Land and against the Mongols if the pope made peace with him, but nothing 
came of this. The catastrophic defeat the Muslims inflicted on the Latins in the 
Holy Land at La Forbie in 1244, causing King Louis IX to take the cross, were 
another diversion. All these crises in theatres other than Latin Greece impelled 
the pope to resume negotiations for Church Union with the Byzantines of Nicaea 
and in effect abandon crusading ventures for Latin Greece, a policy continued to a 
point of almost complete success, but cut short in late 1254 by the deaths of Pope 
Innocent IV, Patriarch Manuel II and Emperor John III Vatatzes. Pope Alexander 
IV exhibited minimal interest in the Latin Empire and even in Church Union, 
concentrating his efforts against combating Manfred, the heir of Emperor Frederick 
II who had died in 1250, in Italy and Sicily. Alexander’s death in May 1261 was 
followed by the Byzantine re-capture of Constantinople in July 1261, which ended 
the Latin Empire’s very existence.
Pope Urban IV (1261-1264) responded to this event in 1262 by proclaiming 
a crusade throughout Europe, both for re-conquering Constantinople and for 
protecting the remaining Latin possessions in Greece. As previously, the mendicants 
were actively involved, with the Franciscans preaching the crusade in France and the 
Dominicans in Poland and Aragon, while as on former occasions assisting the Latin 
Empire was presented as furthering the liberation of the Holy Land. Those taking part 
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were to obtain the same indulgences, privileges and immunities as for the Holy Land 
and papal agents were sent to collect subsidies over the next three years for helping 
the Latin Empire in France, Castile, Hungary, England and Wales. This, however, 
was the last crusade summons for Latin Greece proclaimed on traditional lines, and 
Latin clergy in Spain, France and England all protested vehemently against giving 
subsidies. The author astutely observes, moreover, that it was only proclaimed after 
a long period of papal indifference because with Constantinople lost the papacy had 
been deprived of a major incentive for inducing the Greeks to accept Church Union 
and papal primacy. The papal struggle against Manfred was intensifying at this time, 
with crusades proclaimed against him in Italy and Sardinia in 1263-1264, while 
Hungary was a prey to Mongol incursions and internal unrest. The overtures the 
exiled Latin emperor Baldwin towards him only alienated Pope Urban IV, ultimately 
pushing him into an alliance with Charles of Anjou, the brother of King Louis IX 
of France. The ensuing diplomatic and military struggle between Charles of Anjou 
and the Byzantine emperor Michael Paleologus (1258-1282) during the years 1267 to 
1282 provided the papacy with a new albeit inducement to pressure the Greeks into 
accepting Church Union, that of keeping in check Charles’ designs to conquer the 
revived Byzantine Empire. The author makes it clear that following Charles of Anjou’s 
defeat and destruction of Manfred and his heir Conradin between the years 1266-1268 
and the signing of the Viterbo treaties in 1267 the remnant of continental Latin Greece 
came under Angevin control, influencing papal policy accordingly.
Charles of Anjou’s efforts to lead a crusade against the Byzantines were 
frustrated by a prolonged papal vacancy between the years 1268 when Pope Clement 
IV died and 1271 when Gregory X became pope. Pope Gregory, moreover, placed 
his hopes in Church Union, considering that campaigns against the Byzantines 
were likelier to harm than to help it, and accordingly contained Charles’ ambitions 
while pursuing negotiations for Church Union. This was officially celebrated at the 
Second Council of Lyon on 6 July 1274, and the author rightly sees that now for the 
first time since its loss in 1261 the papacy questioned the legitimacy of restoring the 
Latin Empire. He argues clearly that despite fierce internal opposition good relations 
with Rome were essential to Michael Paleologus as the only way of preventing an 
Angevin attack on his empire, and so had to be maintained at any cost. Michael 
even offered to assist the pope in a crusade to the Holy Land and encouraged him 
to use the crusade as a means of recovering Byzantine territory lost to the Turks in 
Asia Minor, a remarkable about-face whereby the Byzantines, hitherto threatened 
by crusades, now sought to utilise them to recover lost lands.
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From 1276 to 1280 the three short-lived successors to Pope Gregory X continued 
his policy of negotiations, albeit with less enthusiasm and trust in the Byzantine 
Greeks, and a greater willingness to invoke the threat of an Angevin attack on 
Byzantium. Once the ruler of Epirus Nicephorus had become his vassal, Charles’ 
designs became more dangerous, and in 1280 a large army under Hugh le Rousseau 
de Sully besieged Berat in Albania, only to be defeated by a Byzantine force in 
1281 which then proceeded to occupy much of Epirus. In February 1281 a new 
pro-Angevin pope, Martin IV, was elected, and in November he excommunicated 
Emperor Michael Paleologus, declared him and the Greeks to be schismatics 
and heretics and prohibited the export of strategic materials from the West to 
Byzantium, an interesting prohibition as this was normally applied to Muslim 
states in the eastern Mediterranean. The pope did not attempt to justify this sudden 
condemnation, which provoked criticism even in the West, but he did not explicitly 
proclaim a crusade against Byzantium. There is no conclusive evidence for this, at 
any rate none that survives, while cardinal Hugo Atratus told King Edward I of 
England that the alliance between Charles and Venice had been concluded without 
papal consultation. What crusading funds Pope Martin IV did grant Charles in 
March 1282 were for an expedition to the Holy Land, not against Byzantium. By 
pointing this out the author convincingly refutes the viewpoints to the contrary 
previously expressed by Sylvia Schein, Deno Geanakoplos and Kenneth Setton.
Nonetheless, Charles, whose kingdom lacked a strong fleet, was strengthened 
considerably when in July 1281 he and Philip of Courtenay, the titular Latin 
emperor of Constantinople who had succeeded Baldwin II in 1273, concluded an 
alliance with Venice to recover Romania, with Venice undertaking to provide 40 
ships. Charles also concluded alliances with the Balkan powers of Bulgaria, Serbia 
and Epirus against Michael Paleologus, but this well planned assault against 
Byzantium was stymied in the execution by a massive uprising against Angevin 
rule on the island of Sicily, famous in history as the Sicilian Vespers. The revolt 
put an end to both the planned Angevin attack on Byzantium and to Angevin 
rule in Sicily. Invaded and conquered by King Peter of Aragon, who set up a cadet 
dynasty that was to rule the island for centuries, Sicily was lost to the Angevins 
for good. Indeed, it was after these untoward developments that Pope Martin IV, 
by granting tithes in 1284 for a crusade against Peter of Aragon, implicitly but 
clearly legitimized anew Latin Greece as a crusade destination and target, stating 
that Peter’s invasion had harmed the cause of recovering both the Holy Land and 
the empire of Romania.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 09:11:04 |
ΒΙΒΛΙΟΚΡΙΣΙΑ-BOOK REVIEW
BYZANTINA SYMMEIKTA 23 (2013) 351-359
358
In his conclusion the author, while acknowledging that there was a revival of 
crusading activity in Greece under the Angevins from 1302 to 1331, is somewhat 
dismissive of its impact and result, arguing that ‘nothing came of these plans’. 
Even if this is true, one should not overlook the fact that papal commitment to 
crusades in Greece in the early fourteenth century was just as strong as during 
the fourteenth century. After the treaty of Caltabellota of 1302 ending the war 
between the kingdoms of Aragon and Angevin Naples Charles of Valois, the 
brother of King Philip IV of France who had married the titular Latin empress of 
Constantinople Catherine of Courtenay in 1301, renewed the treaties of Viterbo 
and thereby legitimized his claim to the former Latin Empire of Constantinople. 
In 1304 Pope Benedict XI (1303-1304) issued two crusading bulls for the recovery 
of Constantinople, whereby all legacies, redemptions of vows and other revenues 
allocated in the kingdom of France for assisting the Holy Land were made available 
to Charles, while those joining his crusade would obtain the same indulgences as 
for the Holy Land. In addition, the pope granted full remission of penance, with the 
exception of the heavenly reward, to all persons paying for a third party to travel 
at their own expense because they could not go overseas themselves. An original 
element of his bulls was the invocation of the Turkish threat to the Byzantine Empire 
in order to justify a crusade against the Byzantines, seen in this context as a way 
of defending Byzantine lands from the Turks, once they had been conquered, more 
effectively than the Byzantines could do themselves. 
This pope’s successor Benedict V (1305-1314) continued this policy, issuing 
crusade bulls in 1306 granting tithes, indulgences and other privileges, encouraging 
the rulers of Sicily and Naples to support Charles’ projected expedition and 
excommunicating the Byzantine emperor Andronikos II as a schismatic. Although 
the planned crusade eventually failed to depart due to Catherine’s death in October 
1307 and the war in Flanders that impeded French participation, the papacy 
was committed to crusading in Greece no less than in the thirteenth century. In 
November 1322, moreover, Pope John XXII issued a bull granting indulgences for 
three years to those taking part in the campaigns of Philip of Taranto, who had 
married the titular Latin empress Catherine of Valois in 1313 and campaigned in 
the Peloponnese with his brother between the years 1323-1325. Nonetheless, the 
general nature of this indulgence for those dying in action against ‘the schismatics 
Greeks, the Bulgars, the Alans and the Turks and other diverse nations of infidels’ 
does indicate that the crusade in Latin Greece was not longer directed specifically 
against Byzantine Greeks, and with the increasing urgent need to tackle the growing 
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threat of Turkish and more specifically Ottoman expansion from the 1330s onwards 
crusades against the Byzantines came to an end.
In sum this monograph on crusading in Frankish Greece is a significant 
advance on previous studies for several reasons. Firstly it shows that Romania 
was a crusading theatre in its own right throughout the thirteenth century, even 
though it had to compete, often unsuccessfully with other crusading theatres and 
especially with the Holy Land, which in the minds of most Latin Christians was 
not only more significant for crusade expeditions than Latin Greece but was the 
crusading objective par excellence. Secondly it charts not only the history of papal 
commitment to crusading in Greece but also the development of various crusade 
mechanisms, ideological, spiritual and financial, under successive popes from the 
early thirteenth century until 1241, when papal commitment declined in favour of 
negotiations for Church Union, only to revive briefly and unsuccessfully after the 
Greek recapture of Constantinople in 1261. By placing events in Greece within a 
wider European and Mediterranean context the author clearly illustrates the reasons 
why papal initiatives regarding Greece were so difficult to implement, and were 
ultimately unsuccessful due to pressing papal commitments elsewhere at the same 
time. The maps at the end of the book are an invaluable guide in illustrating where 
and when crusade preaching for expeditions to Greece took place in the course of 
the thirteenth century. Furthermore, the tables of popes and other rulers, Latin and 
Greek together with the summaries of crusade proclamations given in chronological 
order at the end help in clarifying and keeping track of the narrative and thematic 
threads when reading the history of a region politically and denominationally 
fragmented as a result of the Fourth Crusade and the ensuing Latin Conquest. This 
book is an important advance not only on the history of the crusade movement 
in Latin Greece, the Balkans and the Aegean but also on the history of Frankish 
Greece per se, by placing it in a broader European context through an examination 
of the genesis and development of crusading there.
Ν. COUREAS 
Cyprus Research Center, 
Nicosia
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